This excerpt from the preface to Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez's new book is one of the most devastating indictments of Bush's foreign and military policy I have read--all the more so because it comes from the man who was the top American commander in Iraq from mid-2003 to mid-2004:
In 2006, I was forced to retire by civilian leaders in the executive
branch of the U.S. government. I was not ready to leave the soldiers I
loved. The Army was my life. Service to my nation was my calling. In
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, I watched
helplessly as the Bush administration led America into a strategic
blunder of historic proportions. It became painfully obvious that the
executive branch of our government did not trust its military. It
relied instead on a neoconservative ideology developed by men and women
with little, if any, military experience. Some senior military leaders
did not challenge civilian decision makers at the appropriate times,
and the courageous few who did take a stand were subsequently forced
out of the service.
From June 14, 2003 to July 1, 2004, the
period immediately following major combat during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, I was the commander of coalition forces, responsible for all
military activity in the Iraq theater of war. I was there when Saddam
Hussein was captured. I was there when the prisoner abuse scandal at
Abu Ghraib occurred. And I was there when low-level enemy resistance
expanded into a massive insurgency that eventually led to full-scale
civil war. During that first year of our nation's occupation of Iraq, I
observed intrusive civilian command of the military, rather than the civilian control
embodied in the Constitution. I saw the cynical use of war for
political gains by elected officials and acquiescent military leaders.
I learned how the pressure of a round-the-clock news cycle could
drive crucial decisions. I witnessed those resulting political
decisions override military requirements and judgments and, in turn,
create conditions that caused unnecessary harm to our soldiers on the
ground.
After our carefully planned and successfully executed
invasion of Iraq, I arrived in the country and was stunned to find that
there had been a complete lack of Phase IV post-invasion planning by
the administration and the military. Not only was there no strategic
vision of what to do next—there was a shocking lack of resources and
proper training for our troops. To make matters worse, the combatant
commander quickly ordered a massive withdrawal of American forces and
redeployed the crucial high-level command centers. Instead of
embracing a joint interagency approach, our government and military
refused to abandon an outdated Cold War mentality. I find it ironic
that I was later criticized for being the youngest and least
experienced three-star general in the Army when I was actually one of
the most experienced general officers in combined joint interagency
operations at all levels of war.
Having fought in Desert Storm
and Kosovo, I was well aware of the fundamental responsibilities of a
commander in a war-fighting environment. Among the most sacred: to take
care of subordinates and never send them into harm's way untrained.
However, because of our rush to war and the need to mobilize rapidly,
some units were deployed without proper training. This fact manifested
itself across the board—among active-duty forces, the Reserves, and
the National Guard. Some general officers chose to cut corners and
certify units as "combat ready" when, in fact, they were not.
* * *
Over the fourteen months of my command in
Iraq, I witnessed a blatant disregard for the lives of our young
soldiers in uniform. It is an issue that constantly eats away at me.
During that time, 813 American soldiers lost their lives, and more than
7,000 were wounded. I cannot do, say, or write anything that would
dishonor them. But to not set the record straight would, I
believe, dishonor the legacy of their service. There is a camp of
commanders who feel that retired generals should not stand up and voice
their views on any policy, much less against a policy gone awry. I am
now making camp with those who believe our voices must be heard in
order to help America prepare for the future battles it must win—so
that democracy itself survives.
The contempt Bush has for the armed forces comes across quite clearly here. In public, Bush encourages Americans to "support our troops," and insists that he will be guided by his military commanders in making decisions about troop strength levels. The actual practices of the administration, as outlined by Sanchez, tell a very different story.
